Post-Salafism: Is Salafism Beginning to Fragment? | Dr Besnik Sinani: Blogging Theology- Oct 3, 2026

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The Wahhabi Roots of Saudi Nationalism and the Persistence of Religious Nationalism: https://themaydan.com/2024/03/the-wah... Konak Institute: https://www.konak.org/besnik-sinani-bio  / besnik-sinani-067992353

Article:The Wahhabi Roots of Saudi Nationalism and the Persistence of Religious Nationalism
By Besnik Sinani // March 13, 2024- Maydan:An online publication of the AbuSulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University

Full Article:https://themaydan.com/2024/03/the-wahhabi-roots-of-saudi-nationalism-and-the-persistence-of-religious-nationalism/

"In January, 2022, Saudi Arabia announced that the following month, on February 22nd, 2022, the kingdom would begin celebrating a new national holiday. This celebration, termed “Founding Day,” pushed back the inception of the nation almost three decades prior to the fateful meeting in 1744 between Muhammad Ibn Saud, the then head of the small Saudi clan, and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the religious reformer convinced that most Muslims had become idol-worshipers. The new celebration presents an alternative account, which removes the Wahhabis from the founding narrative of the nation, a further indication that nationalism is replacing Wahhabism as the legitimizing ideology of the kingdom. This observation reflects the history of ideological tension between nationalism and Wahhabism. Has that relationship, however, always been confrontational?
Nationalist ideology was long considered irrelevant in Saudi Arabia, due to seemingly two opposing forces, the country’s tribal fragmentation, which precluded a sense of national unity, and to the prominence of religion, which promoted a sense of brotherhood that transcended national boundaries. Saudi ulama have regarded nationalism as an expression of atheism. In the midst of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia spearheaded an ideological battle against Arab Nationalism, and King Faysal (d. 1975), aided by the ulama, emerged as the celebrated leader of a competing form of mobilization, known as Pan-Islamism. When King Abdullah (d. 2015) first recognized the Saudi National Day in 2005, and later declared it a National Holiday, he did so against the verdict of the ulama. In this context, the state promoted nationalism in an attempt to curb the power of religion in society. Taking place in the backdrop of the Islamist opposition movement of the 1990s, known as the Sahwa, the celebration of the National Day, together with major educational and cultural projects were part of a larger state policy aimed at what Rosie Bsheer has depicted as a de-centering of religion from the public sphere and from its historical role as the ideological backbone of the kingdom. The contemporary state promotion of nationalism aims to dramatically reduce the role of religion, and bring the focus of loyalty to the Royal Family, especially the Crown Prince, MBS.

Besnik Sinani is the author of the forthcoming monograph “Sufism in Saudi Arabia Since 1979: the Politics of Orthodoxy in Contemporary Islam” to be published by Brill in 2024. He is an AIWG fellow at the Center for Muslim Theology, Tübingen University. A version of this article was first presented in “The Religious Dimensions of Nationalism” Conference, at the Cini Foundation in Venice in 2021.

PhD Thesis PDF: The Future of Sufism in Saudi Arabia Under Salafi–Sufi Polemics and Vision 2030’s Adoption of Wasaṭiyya: Khalid S. Al Nassar MA ,Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD Theology and Religious Studies School of Critical Studies College of Arts University of Glasgow 

https://theses.gla.ac.uk/85207/4/2025alnassarphd.pdf

ABSTRACT: In the aftermath of the poor reputation acquired by the government-supported Salafi establishment as the principal source of political Islam’s fundamentalist ideology behind Islamic terrorism, the Saudi government was compelled to rethink its internal socioreligious policies and imposition of the austere Salafism on the heterogenous Saudi society. Societal pluralism was promoted when different groups within society, Sufis, Shīʿa and liberal modernists, were all invited to participate in national dialogue forums. These forums were precursors to major socioreligious reform, as expressed in the country’s Vision 2030. Pluralism is sought in the controversial Qurʾanic concept of wasaṭiyya (middle way), hoping to provide a solid Islamic foundation for the unprecedented socioreligious change of attitude. Wasaṭiyya would achieve two premises, as advanced in this thesis. First, it would instil an intraIslamic and societal pluralism within the heterogeneous composition of Saudi society. Second, it would promote public acceptance of harmonious coexistence across cultural and religious worlds. The prevailing Salafi establishment’s definition of wasaṭiyya is not conducive to fulfilling the two premises mentioned above. Instead, this thesis proposes that an alternative Sufi-defined wasaṭiyya, grounded in taṣawwuf’s two principles of sulūk (behaviour; conduct) and akhlāq (ethics), would better fulfil the two premises. Yet, in a country known for its deeprooted Salafi abhorrence of taṣawwuf (Sufism), Sufism’s approach to wasaṭiyya cannot be addressed outside the context of the Salafi‒Sufi polemical relationship. Through a review of the literature and multimedia sources, a comparative analysis was conducted, and Salafi‒Sufi refutations and counter-refutations were identified. The research revealed that the Sufi interpretation of wasaṭiyya was inclusive, promoting pluralistic intraIslamic and a disposition towards modernist schools of thought. Taṣawwuf’s wasaṭiyya underlines a new comprehensive approach to an Islamic philosophy for life that naturally fulfils the two premises of the socioreligious-cum-political aspect of Vision 2030. Although the state of taṣawwuf in Saudi Arabia is far from widely accepted, government-supported intellectual efforts and official public media programmes about taṣawwuf target the country’s intelligentsia. This highlights the intellectual acknowledgement of true Sufism, in contrast to pseudo-Sufism, as essential to Islamic ethics. Consequently, this thesis advocates including Sufism’s two principles, sulūk and aklāq, in the country’s religious education system.

Article:In Saudi Arabia, a Resurgence of Sufism: Faiza Saleh Ambah:Special to The Washington Post-May 2, 2006
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/01/AR2006050101380.html

"Salman al-Odah, the country's most popular puritanical cleric, who was jailed in the 1990s for opposing the presence of U.S. troops in the kingdom, accepted an invitation to visit Sufi cleric Abdallah Fadaaq's mawlid and lesson last week. The scene at Fadaaq's house was an obvious sign of conciliation.Al-Odah sat with his hands neatly folded in his lap, wearing a red-and-white checkered headdress and clear wraparound glasses and sporting the short scraggly beard that indicates a conservative. Fadaaq, who at 39 is emerging as the new symbol of Hejazi Sufism, wore the white turban, the white overcoat and shawl typical of Sufis, wooden prayer beads resting on his lap. "It's true that there are differences between the way people practice their faith in this country, and this is an indication that people are using their minds and thinking, which is a good thing," Fadaaq said. "But what we should concentrate on are the expanses that bring us together, like the prophet. We must take advantage of what we have in common."

Article:Visiting H.E. Al-Sayyid Abdallah Fadaaq, the highest ranking Sufi cleric of Arabia:Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin Wordpress
https://ahmedamiruddin.wordpress.com/2010/07/22/visiting-h-e-al-sayyid-abdallah-fadaaq-the-chief-sufi-cleric-of-arabia/

Al-Sayyid Abdallah Fadaaq is the leading Sufi cleric of the Hijaz and the cheif of the Husayni line of the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace and blessings be upon him) descendents in the Hijaz. Al-Sayyid Abdullah comes from a family of Islamic scholars from Makkah Al Mukkaramah. His grandfather was amongst the leading scholars of the Hijaz during the Ottoman and Hashemite era and served as Imam at the Grand Mosque of Makkah. Differences arising with the current Wahabi regime forced him to leave teaching at the Grand Mosque in Makkah like his ancestors, to teach privately from his home in Jeddah. Shaykh Abdullah has authored many books and regularly appears in the Arab media and was a close student of the late Sufi scholar and sage of Arabia; Imam Al-Sayyid Muhammad ibn Alawi Al-Maliki Makki (rah).
Al-Sayyid Abdullah Fadaaq invited Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin, a Deputy of Shaykh Mehmet Nazim Adil al-Haqqani, to his home during his Hijaz tour.